

# U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

APPENDIX 8B\* GENERAL AGENDA, STATION SITE VISITS

An important part of the review at the operating license stage is a site visit. It is preferable to have the site visit sometime before the completion of the drawing review. The purpose of the site visit is to supplement the review of the design based on the drawings and to evaluate the actual implementation of the design as installed at the site. The Regional Office of Regulatory Operations having jurisdiction over the plant under consideration should be notified ahead of time of the visit so that the regional inspectors can become familiar on a first-hand basis with findings that may require followup action. Since proper implementation of design is the ultimate goal of the technical review process, the importance of a site visit is self-evident. The following is a typical general agenda that may be used as a guide for developing a specific agenda for the plant under review.

# 1. Preliminary Discussions

- a. Unresolved items.
- b. Plant layout for touring.
- c. Special interest areas.

## 2. Control Room

- a. General layout.
- b. Diesel control board.
- c. Cabling in control room (separation, loading, etc.).
- d. Engineered safety feature initiation and bypass switch arrangements and status panels.
- e. Power system control and mimic panel.
- f. DC system monitoring and alarms.

# 3. Cable Runs and Cable Spreading Area

- a. General layout.
- b. Degree of separation.

\*Formerly part of SRP Section 7 Appendix 7B.

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#### **USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN**

Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the review of applications to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents are made available to the public as part of the Commission's policy to inform the nuclear industry and the general public of regulatory procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commission's regulations and compliance with them is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan.

Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to reflect new information and experience.

Comments and suggestions for improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulation, Washington, D.C. 20555.

- c. Diverse wiring.
- d. Tray or wireway density (percentage fill).
- e. Fire detection and protection.
- f. Penetrations and cable terminations.
- g. Identification of cables and raceways.

## 4. Switchgear Rooms

- a. General layout.
- b. Physical and electrical separation of redundant units.
- c. Potential for damage due to fire, missiles, etc.
- d. Cable installation.
- e. Fire protection.

# 5. Battery and Charger Installations

- a. General layout.
- b. Physical and electrical separation.
- c. Potential for damage due to fire, missiles, etc.
- d. Fire protection.
- e. Ventilation protection.
- f. Monitoring instrumentation and alarms.

## 6. Diesel Generators

- a. General layout.
- b. Physical and electrical separation of redundant units.
- c. Fire supply system.
- d. Fire protection.
- e. Diesel generator local control panel(s) and instruments and controls.
- f. Auxiliary systems starting air, combustion air, ventilation, engine cooling, etc.
- g. Potential for damage and degradation due to flooding, missiles, dust, etc.

# 7. Instrument Piping

a. Potential for damage due to fire, flooding, etc.

# 8. <u>Switchyard</u>

- a. General layout.
- b. Physical and electrical separation of transmission circuits, buses, breakers, and control circuits.
- c. Relay house.
- d. Control power supplies (AC and DC).
- e. Potential for damage due to fire, missiles, etc.
- f. Fire detection and protection.

# 9. Reactor Building

- a. General layout.
- b. Potential for cable damage due to fire, missiles, pipe breaks etc.
- Separation of piping and cable to redundant equipment.

# 10. Turbine Building

a. General layout.

- b. Turbine overspeed protection systems: instrumentation arrangement and layout.
- c. Provisions for testing overspeed protection system; turbine stop, control, intercept, and extraction steam valves.
- d. Potential for cable damage due to fire, missiles, pipe break, etc.
- e. Turbine bypass system, general arrangement.

## 11. Shared Systems for Multi-Unit Sites

- a. Equipment location and potential for damage.
- b. Control room control and assignment to accident unit.
- c. Status information provided to all operators.
- d. Availability upon completion of first unit.

## 12. Main Steam Lines

a. Flow path below MSIVs - type of shutoff valves and source of control (local, control room, etc.).

## 13. Shutdown Outside Control Room

- a. Remote shutdown panels arrangement, separation, and layout.
- b. Potential for damage due to fire, missiles, etc.
- c. Identification of control and monitoring equipment.

# 14. Relay Room

- a. General layout.
- b. Nuclear and reactor protection instrument cabinet arrangement, separation, and identification.
- c. Potential for damage due to fire, missiles, etc.

#### 15. ESF Systems and Pump Rooms

- a. General layout.
- b. Physical and electrical separation of redundant equipment.
- c. Potential for damage due to fire, missiles, etc.
- d. Cable and raceway layout.
- e. Identification of cables, raceways, and equipment.

## 16. Vital Instrumentation Power Supply Installation

- a. General layout.
- b. Physical and electrical separation.
- c. Potential for damage from fire, missiles, etc.
- d. Monitoring instrumentation.
- e. Cable and raceway layout.
- f. Identification of cables, raceways, and equipment.